Colorado elections clerk cleared in election breach probe

DENVER (AP) — Colorado's secretary of state says a Republican elections clerk has been cleared of accusation that he was involved in a potential security breach of elections equipment and that she is closing her investigation of the case.

Secretary Jena Griswold said in a Thursday statement that Merlin Klotz, clerk and recorder of suburban Douglas County, had responded to an order that he disclose information about a possible copying of data from an elections server. The investigation was triggered by a social media post attributed to Klotz, who denied anyone had made images of server hard drives, Griswold said.

Griswold, a Democrat, said her office's investigation also determined no one had unauthorized access to voting equipment in the suburban Denver county.
Klotz, who with others filed a lawsuit against Griswold in November demanding a third-party audit of Colorado's 2020 election, was the third Republican election clerk in Colorado under investigation for alleged breaches of state election systems.

Mesa County Clerk and Recorder Tina Peters is being investigated by a grand jury in a breach of the system there. Elbert County Clerk and Recorder Dallas Schroeder is under scrutiny for allegedly copying his voting system's hard drive.

Griswold adopted temporary election rules, announced today following recent security protocol breaches and violations in Mesa and Elbert counties, to ensure the security and custody of Colorado's voting systems, according to a news release from Griswold's office. 

Key provisions of temporary rules, which have been implemented immediately include:

• Password and User Account Security: Creates various additional requirements for passwords and user accounts for voting system equipment.
   
• Acceptable Use Policy: Requires signing of the Department of State’s “acceptable use” policy for voting system equipment for individuals who will have access to that equipment. This is comparable to our acceptable use policy for the statewide voter registration database (SCORE), which has been in place for several years. 

• Hard Drive Imaging: Prohibits the creation of images of the hard drives of the voting system equipment and disclosure of such images without prior approval by the Department of State.
   
• Trusted Build Procedures: Addresses procedures that county clerks must follow during a trusted build, including that evidence of a successful background check must be disclosed to the Department of State for all individuals who will be present during the trusted build. In addition, the county clerk must ensure that the trusted build is conducted under video surveillance.
   
• Seal Requirements: Counties must continuously comply with seal requirements and may not allow any unattended voting system component to remain unsealed at any point after trusted build has been installed on the component.
   
• Access to Secures Areas and Voting Systems: Any individual who is prohibited from having physical contact with any voting equipment under section 1-5-607(1), C.R.S. may not access a room with voting equipment unless accompanied by one or more individuals with authorized access. This means that in counties with a population over 100,000, elected officials may not enter a room with voting equipment alone. Prior to the temporary rules, only physically accessing equipment was restricted.
   
• Access to Election Management Systems: Counties may grant administrative privileges to no more than four individual users, which is a decrease from 10 previously authorized, further access permission is approved by the Department of State. Counties must identify the employees with administrative privileges in the security plan filed with the Department of State.

Macie May wrote through this article.